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Abstract
The electronic ticketing was developed within the scope of the Go!Card project. It is used as
a test object for the techniques for the development of secure smartcard applications that are
developed in the Go!Card project. Our development method for secure smartcard applications
is described in [HRS02].
The electronic ticketing case study deals with an e-commerce scenario for the electronic
sale of railway or flight tickets. The customers buy their tickets from a server that transmits
the signed and encrypted tickets to the customer, where they are loaded on the customers
smartcard. Then the smartcard decrypts and verifies the tickets and stores them. The tickets
are checked and obliterated offline by the train’s conductor using a portable computer. This
report describes the scenario of the electronic ticketing case study, we explain the different
functions and discuss desirable security objectives.
This report completely supersedes [Han01] which now is obsolete. The design and the
description of the protocols were adjusted to the latest findings of our research and some
additional protocols were added.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Chipcards
Magnetic stripe cards are used as portable, machine-readable data storage for a while. Best
known example are the cards issued by the banks, most people have at least one. The
possession of such a card and the knowledge of the appropriate PIN1 permits access to the
account of the card holder.
Over the years some basic disadvantages of magnetic stripe cards became obvious. The
storage capacity is very small, the data stored on the card isn’t protected because everyone can
read it using a magnetic stripe reader. Furthermore magnetic stripe cards aren’t taper-poof.
External effects like magnetic fields endanger the data on the magnetic stripe. It happens,
that automatic teller machines refuse cards, because the stored date is corrupted.
Some of the weaknesses of magnetic stripe cards could be eliminated by a new technology.
Chipcards offer a higher storage capacity, they are less vulnerable to external effects and
they offer the possibility to restrict the access to the stored data and to prevent manipula-
tion. Chipcards are plastic cards of the same size as common credit cards with an embedded
integrated circuit. We distinguish between memory cards which only have a memory chip em-
bedded and microprocessor cards which have a microprocessor embedded which is can execute
programs. The technical data and the physical characteristics of chipcards are determined in
the ISO-norms 7810, 7813 and 7816.
The simplest available chipcards are so called memory cards. They only have a memory
chip embedded, commonly EPROM, EEPROM or FLASH memory.
The more capable chipcards are the so called microprocessor cards or smartcards. Be-
cause of their embedded microprocessor, they have wider range of possible applications as
the memory cards. The processor cards aren’t just passive data carriers, but rather they are
able to perform calculations and to process informations. The fundamental advantage of this
is, that the secret data that is stored on the card, mustn’t leave the card in order to be used.
The card carries out all necessary calculations herself and outputs only the result, but not
the used secret data. Because the stored secret data can be processed on the card, the card
applications can be implemented in a way that prohibits unauthorized access or manipula-
tion of the application data. Therefore smartcards are a tamper-proof storage for secret data.
In the meantime many smartcards are available in specialized cryptographic versions, that
feature an integrated crypto-coprocessor, that enables the smartcard to exchange encrypted
1PIN: Personal Identification Number
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Figure 1.1: Schematic picture of a microprocessor card
data . Best known example of smartcards is the SIM, that is included in all GSM-cell phones.
The SIM identifies the user towards the telephone company and enables the encrypted com-
munication between the cell phone and the base station. The latest step in the development
are multiapplicative smartcards that allow to install and delete card programs dynamically.
Because of that it is possible to supplement a smartcard with additional services at any time.
A special case of the smartcars are the so called JavaCards that have the advantage that they
can be programmed in the high-level programming language Java.
1.2 The Go!Card Project
The research project ”Go!Card — Formal methods for the secure application of Java smart-
cards” investigates security problems connected to the application of multiapplicative Java
smartcards. Our objective is a development method for provably secure smartcard applica-
tions and the provision of tools for design of the communication protocols and the development
of the card programs. The research project Go!Card is sponsored by the German national
research foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) within the scope of the Schwerpunk-
tprogramm ”Sicherheit in der Informations- und Kommunikationstechnik”.
There are four crucial points in the development of a smartcard application in which a
mistake can lead to security leaks or malfunctions.
1. Application and protocol design
2. Mapping of highlevel data types on the data types supported by the smartcard
3. Correctness of the implementation
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4. Coexistence of potentially evil cardlets on one card
1.2.1 Application and protocol design
Composed communication protocols combining the authentication of the participants, the
transfer of the application data and the digital signatures or the like, often occur in smartcard
applications. Careless design of these protocols can easily lead to vulnerabilities in the system
[AN95, Pau98]. Different security issues are possible, for example the accidental disclosure of
secret data or the illegitimate duplication of valuables, e. g. electronic coins.
1.2.2 Data mapping
In the communication protocols occur as data types documents, signatures or similar, but the
data exchange between card and terminal is done using APDUs2. The avoidance of errors
in the mapping of the communication protocol data types onto the APDUs is subject of this
work package.
1.2.3 Correctness of the implementation
This work package investigates the prevention of implementation errors in the card programs
and the securing of a correct implementation of the communication protocols. Therefore we
adjust and if necessary enhance well known techniques for program verification to the specifics
of JavaCard programs.
1.2.4 Multiapplicativity
The existence of multiple application on one smartcard induces the problem of an appropriate
protection of the application data. The card programs have to protect their data against other
potentially evil applications. Besides the sealing-off of the card applications, a well-regulated
communication between cardlets must be possible. The work package investigates security
policies that ensure the desired properties of the data flow.
1.2.5 Synopsis
It is our objective to establish an integrated methodology for the development of secure
smartcard applications. This method should cover all the crucial points of the application
development and it should accompany the developer from the application design till the
implementation.
2Application Protocol Data Unit
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Chapter 2
The electronic Ticketing case study
To trial our new development method and the verification calculus we test our results on case
studies. The central case study of the Go!Card project is the electronic Ticketing application.
This is a e-commerce scenario dealing with the sales of railway our flight tickets. The central
concept of electronic Ticketing is that the tickets no longer exist in a paper form. The tickets
are ordered, issued, stored and checked solely electronic. The customer orders the tickets via
a web interface on any PC with smartcard reader or via specialized terminals, which could
be set up in railway stations or travel agencies. The order information is transmitted to the
server of the issuer, which generates matching tickets and reservations and transmits them
over the internet to the smartcard of the customer. The purchased tickets get stored on
the smartcard and can be checked offline by the conductor if required. Therefore he uses a
portable card reader that reads the ticket data from the smartcard and displays them. Using
the same device the conductor obliterates used tickets. Cryptographic methods are used to
prevent manipulation and to ensure that only valid tickets get stored on the smartcard.
2.0.6 Scenario
An overall picture of the electronic Ticketing scenario can be seen in figure 2.1. To realize
the core services three central components are used. These are:
• The customer’s smartcard
• The server of the ticket issuer
• The conductor’s checking device
The smartcard contains the card application that handles the encrypted communication with
the server of the ticket issuer, stores the tickets and shows and obliterates tickets in interaction
with a conductor device. To be able to fulfill its tasks the smartcard must be able to perform
cryptographic operations. The use of encryption ensures the confidentiality of the customer
data, the use of digital signatures ensures integrity and authenticity of the transferred data.
The server of the ticket issuer is activated by a customer who wants to buy a ticket. The
server contacts the customer’s smartcard and prepares for the transmission of a new ticket.
Then he accepts the customer’s order and generates a corresponding ticket, lets the user pay
the ticket and transfers ticket data to the customer’s smartcard.
The conductor’s checking device is used in trains to check and obliterate the tickets of
the passengers. To do so the conductor’s device authenticates itself towards the smartcard,
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Figure 2.1: Structure of the electronic Ticketing case study
requests the ticket data and shows them to the conductor for verification. If the ticket is
okay the checking device orders the smartcard to mark the ticket as obliterated. Thereby
it is crucial that the verification of a ticket can be done offline, thus no network connection
between the train (conductor) and ticket sales system is needed.
The cardlet also provides the possibility to pass on a ticket from one smartcard to another.
Thereby it is important that the ticket is at no time the ticket is in usable condition on both
cards simultaneously because this would permit to defraud the ticket issuer. The impossibility
of imposture is ensured by using an appropriate communication protocol.
Additionally the application allows it to return unused tickets electronically. When an
unused ticket should be returned to the issuer the cardlet transfers the ticket to the server
which initiates the refund of the customer. To prevent fraud this function also requires
appropriate protocols.
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2.0.7 Extensions
The core services of the electronic Ticketing case study can be extended by further functions,
for example the automatic refund of tickets bought for business trips. .
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Chapter 3
Attributes and methods of the
major classes
3.1 The Terminals
The core features of the electronic Ticketing system are realized using three terminals. Pur-
chase and return of tickets are implemented in the Issuer Terminal, card management
functions (Delete Ticket, Set User PIN, . . .) are consolidated in the User Terminal. Oblit-
eration of tickets is the task of the Conductor Terminal.
3.1.1 User Terminal
The User Terminal is used by the card owner to administrate the card, for example this
terminal permits the user to view the currently stored tickets, to delete old tickets and to set
an new PIN.
Tasks
This terminal is used for the following functions:
• Change the lock status of a ticket
• Delete a ticket
• Set a new user PIN
• Transfer a ticket
• View the tickets
Attributes
• dest card challenge This attribute is used to store a challenge received from the
destination card of a ticket transfer.
• dest card key This attribute is used to store the public key of the destination card.
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• dest card key sig This attribute is used to store the signature of the public key of the
destination card.
• error This attribute stores the internal error state of the terminal.
• last cmd This attribute is used to store the last command that was sent to the card.
• lock status This attribute is used to store the desired lock status in the Change Lock
Status-protocol.
• new pin This attribute is used to store the new PIN when a new user PIN should be
set.
• pin This attribute is used to store the PIN of the card owner.
• source card challenge This attribute is used to store a challenge received from the
source card of a ticket transfer.
• source card key This attribute is used to store the public key of the source card.
• source card key sig This attribute is used to store the signature of the public key of
the source card.
• the transferred ticket This attribute is used to store the ticket that is currently
transferred.
• the transferred ticket sig This attribute is used to store the signature of the cur-
rently transferred ticket.
• ticket no This attribute is used to store the number of the selected ticket, for example
the number of the ticket that should be deleted.
3.1.2 Conductor Terminal
The Conductor Terminal is used by the conductor to view and to obliterate tickets. It can
also be used by the card owner to unlock a locked ticket if necessary.
Tasks
• View the tickets
• Obliterate tickets
• Unlock tickets
Attributes
• card authenticated This attribute stores if a card was successfully authenticated.
• card challenge This attribute is used to store a challenge received from a card.
• check This attribute contains a new check that is to be used to obliterate a ticket.
• error This attribute stores the internal error state of the terminal.
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• last cmd This attribute is used to store the last command that was sent to the card.
• pin This attribute is used to store the PIN of the card owner.
• public card key This attribute is used to store the public key of the card.
• public card key sig This attribute is used to store the signature of the public key of
the card.
• public conductor key This attribute is used to store the public key of the conductor
terminal.
• public conductor key sig This attribute is used to store the signature of the public
key of the conductor terminal.
• secret conductor key This attribute is used to store the secret key of the conductor
terminal.
• terminal challenge This attribute is used to store a challenge generated by the ter-
minal.
• ticket no This attribute is used to store the number of the selected ticket.
3.1.3 Issuer Terminal
The Issuer Terminal is used to buy new tickets and to return unused ones.
Tasks
• Buy tickets
• Give back tickets
Attributes
• card authenticated This attribute stores if a card was successfully authenticated.
• card challenge This attribute is used to store a challenge received from a card.
• dest card authenticated Before running the Recover Transfer -protocol, this attribute
must be true to signal a successful authentication of the destination card.
• dest card key This attribute is used by the Recover Transfer -protocol to store the
public key of the destination card of a ticket transfer.
• dest ex trans ticket This attribute is set to true during the processing of the Recover
Transfer -protocol if there is a ticket on the destination card that is marked as in transfer.
• dest source key While a ticket is transfered, the destination card stores the public
key of the source card in the attribute source card key. The value of this attribute
is retrieved by the terminal during the processing of the Recover Transfer -protocol and
stored in this field.
14
• dest transfer in progress Distinguishes whether there is an unfinished transfer on
the destination card or not.
• error This attribute stores the internal error state of the terminal.
• last cmd This attribute is used to store the last command that was sent to the card.
• public card key This attribute is used to store the public key of the card.
• public card key sig This attribute is used to store the signature of the public key of
the card.
• public issuer key This attribute is used to store the public key of the ticket issuer.
• secret issuer key This attribute is used to store the secret key of the ticket issuer.
• source card authenticated Before running the Recover Transfer -protocol, this at-
tribute must be true to signal a successful authentication of the source card.
• source card key This attribute is used by the Recover Transfer -protocol to store the
public key of the source card of a ticket transfer.
• source dest key While a ticket is transfered, the source card stores the public key
of the destination card in the attribute dest card key. The value of this attribute is
retrieved by the terminal during the processing of the Recover Transfer -protocol and
stored in this field.
• source ex trans ticket This attribute is set to true during the processing of the
Recover Transfer -protocol if there is a ticket on the source card that is marked as in
transfer.
• source transfer in progress Distinguishes whether there is an unfinished transfer on
the source card or not.
• terminal challenge This attribute is used to store a challenge generated by the ter-
minal.
• ticket This attribute is used to store a new ticket.
• ticket status Used to store the status of a ticket.
3.2 The Cardlet
The cardlet is that part of the software necessary for electronic ticket which resides on the
smartcard. It is responsible for realisation of communication with the terminals and for the
storage of application data.
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3.2.1 Functions
• anyProtocolRunning() Returns true if there’s currently a protocol running on the card,
i. e. if the nxt cmd isn’t any and otherwise false.
• incompleteLoad() Returns true if a ticket load wasn’t successfully completed and oth-
erwise false.
• incompleteTransfer() Returns true if the card participated in a ticket transfer that
wasn’t properly completed and otherwise false.
• pinOk(pin pin) Returns true if the argument is the correct PIN of the card owner and
otherwise false.
• thisProtocolRunning(cardinstruction ci) Returns true if the current step of the
protocol running is equal to the argument, i. e. if nxt cmd is equal to the value of ci.
Otherwise the functions returns false.
• generateChallenge() Returns a new nonce.
3.2.2 Attributes
• card challenge This attribute is used to store the challenge created by the card.
• conductor authenticated Boolean flag to distinguish whether the conductor was suc-
cessfully authenticated or not.
• dest card challenge Contains the challenge generated by the destination card of a
ticket transfer.
• dest card key Contains the public key of the destination card of a ticket transfer.
• last ticket This attribute contains the index of the last ticket that was stored in the
ticketstore.
• max tickets Contains the number of tickets that can be simultaneously stored on the
card.
• nxt cmd This attribute stores the command that is expected next.
• nxt transfer cmd This attribute contains the next command in a ticket transfer. It is
not cleared by the select()-method. The value of this attribute is used to restore the
correct value of nxt cmd if a call of select() happens while a transfer is under way.
• pin Contains the PIN of the card owner.
• public card key This attribute is used to store the public key of the card.
• public card key sig This attribute is used to store the signature of the public key of
the card.
• public cond key This attribute is used to store the public key of the conductor.
• public issuer key This attribute is used to store the public key of the ticket issuer.
16
• secret card key Contains the secret key of the card.
• source card challenge Contains the challenge generated by the source card of a ticket
transfer.
• source card key This attribute is used to store the public key of the source card of a
ticket transfer.
• terminal challenge Contains the challenge created by the terminal.
• the tickets Contains the ticketstore object.
• the transferred ticket This attribute is used to store the currently transferred ticket
on the destination card.
• ticket no Contains the number of the ticket that is currently returned using the Give
Back Ticket-protocol.
• transfer in progress Boolean flag to distinguish whether the card is involved in an
unfinished transfer or not.
• user authenticated Boolean flag to distinguish whether the card owner was success-
fully authenticated or not.
3.3 The Ticketstore
The ticketstore is part of the electronic ticketing cardlet. It is responsible for the storage of
the ticket data.
3.3.1 Functions
• addCheck(int ticket no, check check) Adds check as a new check to the ticket
with number ticket no.
• changeBlockStatus(int ticket no, int status) Sets the block status of the ticket
with number ticket no to status.
• changeLockStatus(int ticket no, boolean status) Sets the lock status of the ticket
with number ticket no to status.
• deleteTicket(int ticket no) Deletes the ticket indicated by ticket no.
• deleteTransferredTicket() Deletes the ticket that is currently in transfer.
• exTransTicket() Returns true if the ticketstore contains a ticket that is in transfer
and otherwise false.
• getChecks(int ticket no) Returns the checks currently attached to the ticket with
number ticket no.
• getStatus(int ticket no) Returns the status of the ticket with number ticket no.
• getTicket(int ticket no) Returns the ticket with number ticket no.
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• getTransferredTicket() Returns the ticket that is currently marked is in transfer.
• isLocked(int ticket no) Returns true if the ticket with number ticket no is locker
and false otherwise.
• isChecked(int ticket no) Returns true if the ticket with number ticket no is oblit-
erated and false otherwise.
• number() Returns the number of tickets currently stored in the ticketstore.
• storeTicket(ticket ticket) Stores the ticket ticket and returns the position of the
new ticket. The ticket is marked as blocked after it is stored in the ticketstore. It must
be activated by a subsequent execution of changeBlockStatus().
• storeTransferred(ticket ticket) Stores ticket and marks it as in transfer.
• transferredTicketNum() Returns the number of the ticket currently in transfer.
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Chapter 4
The protocols
4.1 Overview
The protocols are all specified as UML[RJB98, OMG99] activity diagrams. Each participant of
a protocol is represented by a swimlane. Most often there are two participants, one terminal
and one smartcard. Only the protocols that deal with the transfer of tickets have three
participants, one terminal and two cards. The activity diagram shows the control flow and the
communication of its protocol. The data exchange is represented by command- and response-
objects. The command-objects are generated by the terminal and sent to the card, while
response-objects are generated by the smartcard. We link a note to each object that contains
information about the composition of a command or response. The activities are used to
describe changes of the internal state of the terminal and the card. We use branches to
express checks of preconditions for protocol steps.
The protocols all have a similar control flow. A protocol run is always initiated by the
terminal. After being triggered off by the user, the terminal calls a function of the cardlet.
Thereby the terminal can transmit data to the cardlet if necessary. The cardlet performs the
requested function and returns data if required. It is not possible for the cardlet to start a
protocol run of its own. Wrong data or unsatisfied security preconditions lead to an exception
and the termination of the protocol run.
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4.2 Add Check
4.2.1 Purpose
This protocol is used to add a check to a ticket on the card. The protocol is used by the
conductor’s portable card reader to obliterate the ticket for the current trip.
4.2.2 Preconditions
The card must be authenticated, this is done using the Authenticate Cardlet-protocol (Sec-
tion 4.3), and the conductor terminal must have been authenticated using the Authenticate
Conductor -protocol (Section 4.4). The ticket number which is transferred to the card must
be a correct ticketnumber, i. e. the transmitted number must be less or equal to the number
of tickets currently stored on the card. There mustn’t be any other protocol running on the
card, i. e. the nxt cmd-field of the cardlet must be any.
4.2.3 The protocol
In the first step of the protocol the server tests if there is an internal error. A protocol
run is only started if there’s no error in the server. If there’s no error the server checks
of the cardlet was previously authenticated. If this is not the case the execution of the
protocol is aborted. Otherwise the server stores the command that will be sent to the card
(last cmd) and sends a command to the card consisting of a card instruction (CMD addCheck),
the number of the ticket to which the check is to be added (ticket no) and the check (check).
The first thing the cardlet does after receiving this command is to check if there’s curently
another protocol running. This is done by checking if nxt cmd is not equal any. If this
condition isn’t satisfied the cardlet generates a SW CONDITIONS NOT SATISFIED-exception. If
the test is successful the cardlet checks if the Conductor Terminal is properly authenticated. If
the terminal isn’t authenticated the cardlet produces a SW SECURITY STATUS NOT SATISFIED-
exception. Otherwise the cardlet tests if the next precondition is satisfied. This precondition
ensures that the ticket number sent by the terminal (ticket no) refer to a ticket that actually
exists. If the number is inappropriate the cardlet produces a SW RECORD NOT FOUND-exception.
If there’s a matching ticket, the cardlet stores the new check and informs the terminal of the
successful completion of the operation by transmitting SW OK. After receiving the expected
response the terminal resets the last cmd-field.
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Figure 4.1: Add Check -protocol
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4.3 Authenticate Cardlet
4.3.1 Purpose
This protocol is used to check the authenticity of a cardlet. Using this protocol a terminal
can check if a cardlet is genuine or a fake. This protocol is used by the conductor terminal
to check the authenticity of a cardlet to be sure that the tickets on the cardlet are to be
considered as authentic.
4.3.2 Preconditions
Before this protocol can be executed the terminal must have acquired and verified the public
key of the card. This is done using the Get Card Key-protocol (Section 4.9). There mustn’t
be any other protocol running on the card, i. e. the nxt cmd-field of the cardlet must be any
and the user must be authenticated, i. e. the correct user PIN must have been entered using
the Authenticate User -protocol (Section 4.5).
4.3.3 The protocol
As in all other protocols the first step in the Authenticate Cardlet-protocol is to test, if the
terminal isn’t in an error condition. If there’s no error the terminal can advance to the next
step, to check that the card key and the card key signature were retrieved from the card and
that the signature is a valid certificate for the key. The protocol run will only continue if
the signature is ok. If these tests were successfully passed, the terminal generates a challenge
(a random value of fixed size), stores the challenge in the terminal challenge-field and
stores the card instruction that will be sent to the card in last cmd. The next step the
terminal performs is to send a command to the cardlet. The command is made up of the card
instruction (CMD authenticateCard) and the challenge generated before. After receiving this
command the card verifies that all the preconditions of this protocol are fulfilled. First there
mustn’t be another protocol running, this is checked by testing if nxt cmd is equal to any and
secondly the user or the conductor must have been authorized. If a precondition isn’t satisfied
the cardlet generates an appropriate exception. If the test are successful the cardlet stores
the received challenge in the field terminal challenge and sends a response to the terminals
consisting of SW OK and the signature of the challenge. After receiving the response from the
card, the terminal tries to verify the signature. If the signature is correct the terminal sets
the field card authenticated to true and last cmd to none.
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Figure 4.2: Authenticate Cardlet-protocol
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4.4 Authenticate Conductor
4.4.1 Purpose
This protocol is used to authenticate the conductor terminal. After a successful protocol run
the smartcard can be sure to communicate with a genuine conductor terminal.
4.4.2 Preconditions
There mustn’t be any other protocol running on the card, i. e. the nxt cmd-field of the cardlet
must be any.
4.4.3 The protocol
As usual the protocol starts with the terminal checking if it is ready. If there’s no prob-
lem, the terminal stores the card instruction that will be sent to the cardlet. Then the
command, consisting of the card instruction CMD loadCondKey and the public key of the
conductor terminal, is sent to the card. The first action to be performed by the card af-
ter receiving the command is to check if there’s already a protocol running. If this is the
case, an exception is generated. Otherwise the cardlet stores the received key in the field
public cond key and the next card instruction (CMD checkCondKeySig) that must be sent
by the terminal in nxt cmd. Thereafter the cardlet send its answer to terminal. The answer
consists only of SW OK. After receiving the response form the card, the terminal stores the
card instruction that will be sent to the card next (CMD checkCondKeySig) and sends the next
command, consisting of the card instruction and the signature of the public key of the con-
ductor (public cond key sig), to the card. After receiving this command, the card checks
of the card instruction sent by the card is the correct card instruction for the current step in
the protocol (thisProtocolRunning(CMD checkCondKeySig)). If the correct card instruction
was sent, the cardlet verifies the signature of the conductor key. If the signature is not correct
the cardlet creates an SW SECURITY STATUS NOT SATISFIED-exception, otherwise the cardlet
generates a new challenge and stores the next expected card instruction. Then a response is
sent to the terminal containing the new challenge. The terminal stores the received challenge
and the card instruction that will be sent to the card next and sends a new command to the
card. This command consists of the card instruction (CMD authenticateConductor) and the
signature of the card challenge. The cardlet first verifies that it is in the correct protocol
step and, if this is the case, verifies that the signature of the challenge is correct. If the
signature could be verified, the cardlet sets the attribute conductor authenticated to true
and next cmd to any. After receiving the answer, the terminal sets last cmd to none.
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Figure 4.3: Authenticate Conductor -protocol
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4.5 Authenticate User
4.5.1 Purpose
This protocol is used to verify the authenticity of the card holder. First the card holder
enters his PIN. Then the inputed value is transmitted to the card which compares it with the
expected value.
4.5.2 Preconditions
There mustn’t be any other protocol running on the card, i. e. the nxt cmd-field of the cardlet
must be any.
4.5.3 The protocol
First the terminal checks for internal errors. If the terminal is ready the user is prompted for
the PIN. The PIN entered by the user is stored in the attribute pin. The last cmd-attribute is
set to CMD verifyPIN. The a command is sent to the cardlet consisting of the card instruction
CMD verifyPIN and the PIN entered by the user. After receiving this command the cardlet
tests if there isn’t a protocol running currently. If there’s no other protocol, the cardlet verifies
if the transmitted PIN is correct. If this is the case, the attribute user authenticated is set
to true. SW OK is sent as answer to the terminal. If one of the precondition wasn’t satisfied,
an appropriate exception is thrown. After receiving the answer, the terminal sets last cmd
to none.
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Figure 4.4: Authenticate User -protocol
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4.6 Change Lock Status
4.6.1 Purpose
This protocol is used to change the lock status of a ticket on a card. Tickets can either be
locked or unlocked. The data of locked tickets is only revealed if the user is authenticated,
this means that locked tickets aren’t visible for the conductor.
4.6.2 Preconditions
The owner of the card must have been successfully authenticated using the Authenticate User -
protocol (Section 4.5). The ticket number which is transferred to the card must be a correct
ticket number, i. e. the transmitted number must be less or equal to the number of tickets
currently stored on the card. There mustn’t be any other protocol running on the card, i.
e. the nxt cmd-field of the cardlet must be any.
4.6.3 The protocol
After checking for internal errors, the terminal asks the user to select the ticket whose
lock status is to be changed and the new lock status. The data entered by the user is
stored in the attributes ticket no and lock status. The attribute last cmd is set to
CMD changeLockStatus. Then the terminal send a command to the cardlet consisting of
the card instruction CMD changeLockStatus and ticket no and lock status as additional
data. After receiving this command, the cardlet verifies that no other protocol is currently
running. If this is the case the cardlet checks if the user was authenticated previously and
afterwards it is tested if the first argument refers to an existing ticket. If all checks are suc-
cessful the lock state of the ticket identified by the first argument is set to the value of the
second argument. Terminating the activity of the card SW OK is returned if no errors occurred.
After receiving the answer, the terminal sets last cmd to none.
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Figure 4.5: Change Lock Status-protocol
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4.7 Continue Transfer
4.7.1 Purpose
If the transfer of a ticket is performed on a computer with only one card reader, the user must
switch between the source card and the destination card at certain points of the protocol.
Since removal and later reinsertion of a smartcard into a card reader leads to a reset of the
card, which leads to the deletion of the value stored in nxt cmd, the correct value of the
field must be restored before the transfer of the ticket can be continued. This is done by the
Continue Transfer -protocol by copying the value of the nxt transfer cmd-field into nxt cmd.
4.7.2 Preconditions
This function can be used only if there’s an incomplete transfer on the card, i. e. the
transfer in progress-field of the cardlet must be true. Additionally, there mustn’t be
any other protocol running on the card, i. e. the nxt cmd-field of the cardlet must be any.
4.7.3 The protocol
If the terminal is ready, last cmd is set to CMD continueTransfer and a command consisting
of just this card instruction is sent to the cardlet. After receiving this command the cardlet
verifies if there’s not another protocol running and if the card actually participated in a ticket
transfer that wasn’t completed successfully. If all preconditions are satisfied, the attribute
nxt cmd is set to the value of nxt transfer cmd and SW OK is returned to the terminal. After
receiving the answer, the terminal sets last cmd to none.
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Figure 4.6: Continue Transfer -protocol
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4.8 Delete Ticket
4.8.1 Purpose
This protocol is used to delete a ticket from a card.
4.8.2 Preconditions
The owner of the card must have been successfully authenticated using the Authenticate User -
protocol (Section 4.5). The ticket number which is transferred to the card must be a correct
ticket number, i. e. the transmitted number must be less or equal to the number of tickets
currently stored on the card. There mustn’t be any other protocol running on the card, i.
e. the nxt cmd-field of the cardlet must be any.
4.8.3 The protocol
First the server ensures that it isn’t in an erroneous condition. If the terminal is ready the
user can select the ticket that he wants to delete. The user input is stored in ticket no.
The attribute last cmd is set to CMD deleteTicket and a command is sent to the card.
The command is made up of the card instruction CMD deleteTicket and the ticket number.
After receiving the command the cardlet checks that no other protocol is running. If so the
cardlet verifies that the user is authenticated and that the data refers to an existing ticket.
If the preconditions are satisfied the ticket, identified by the parameter, is deleted ans SW OK
is returned to the terminal. After receiving the answer, the terminal sets last cmd to none.
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Figure 4.7: Delete Ticket-protocol
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4.9 Get Card Key
4.9.1 Purpose
This protocol is used by the terminals to determine the public key of a card. After receiving
the public card key and its signature from the card, the terminal verifies whether the certificate
is ok or not.
4.9.2 Preconditions
There mustn’t be any other protocol running on the card, i. e. the nxt cmd-field of the cardlet
must be any.
4.9.3 The protocol
After checking that it is ready, the terminal sets last cmd to CMD getCardKey and sends
a command containing the card instruction CMD getCardKey to the cardlet. On receiving
the command, the cardlet checks if there’s another protocol running at the moment. If this
is the case an exception is thrown, otherwise nxt cmd is set to CMD getCardKeySig. The
cardlets sends a reply to the terminal consisting of SW OK as statusword and the value of
public card key as data. After receiving the reply, the reply data is stored in public card key
and last cmd is set to CMD getCardKeySig. Then the terminal sends the next command,
consisting of CMD getCardKeySig, to the cardlet. After receiving this command, the cardlet
verifies that the expected card instruction was sent. If this is the case the cardlet sets nxt cmd
to any and sends a reply made up of the statusword SW OK and public card key sig as data,
otherwise an exception is thrown. On receiving this reply the terminal tries to verify the sig-
nature of the public key of the card. Only if the signature is correct, the terminal continues
by storing the received card key signature in public card key sig, setting card key sig ok
to true and last cmd to none.
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Figure 4.8: Get Card Key-protocol
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4.10 Give Back Ticket
4.10.1 Purpose
This protocol is used to return unused tickets to the issuer.
4.10.2 Preconditions
Before this protocol can be executed the terminal must have acquired and verified the public
key of the card. This is done using the Get Card Key-protocol (Section 4.9). The owner
of the card must have been successfully authenticated using the Authenticate User -protocol
(Section 4.5). The ticket number which is transferred to the card must be a correct ticket
number, i. e. the transmitted number must be less or equal to the number of tickets currently
stored on the card. The ticket that should be returned mustn’t be obliterated. There mustn’t
be any other protocol running on the card, i. e. the nxt cmd-field of the cardlet must be any.
4.10.3 The protocol
First the terminal ensures that it is ready to run the protocol. If this is possible the user is
requested to select the ticket that should be given back. The user input is stored in ticket no.
Then the terminal generates a challenge, stores it in terminal challenge and lastly sets
last cmd to CMD giveBackTicket. Then a command is sent to the card consisting of the
card instruction CMD giveBackTicket and terminal challenge and ticket no as data. The
cardlet receives this command and at first verifies that no other protocol is running at the
moment. If this is the case, the other preconditions are checked: Is the user authenticated,
does the transferred ticket number refer to an existing ticket and isn’t the referenced ticket
already obliterated? If one of the preconditions isn’t fulfilled an appropriate exception is
thrown. Otherwise the cardlets continues with the execution of the protocol. It sets the block
status of the ticket, that is identified by the data in the command, to STATUS GIVE BACK, it
sets nxt cmd to CMD getDataSig, ticket no to the value of the second part of the command
data and terminal challenge to the value of the first part of the parameters. The the
cardlet sends a reply to the terminal containing the status word SW OK and the data of the
ticket in question. The ticket data is encrypted for the transmission to the server. After
receiving this reply, the server decrypts the ticket data and stores it in the attribute ticket.
Furthermore last cmd is set to CMD getDataSig. Then the terminal sends another command
to the cardlet containing only the card instruction CMD getDataSig. After receiving the
command, the cardlets verifies that the contained card instruction is the one expected. If this
is the case the cardlet generates a challenge, stores it in card challenge and sets nxt cmd to
CMD eraseTicket, otherwise an exception is thrown. The cardlet sends a reply that is made
up of the status word SW OK and a data part containing a digital signature of the ticket and
the challenge sent by the terminal as first part and card challenge as second part. After
receiving this reply the terminal has to verify that the signature is correct and the ticket
can be given back. If so the ticket is accepted and the customer is refunded. The data base
system ensures that this ticket can’t be given back again. The terminal stores the second
part of the reply data in card challenge and sets last cmd to CMD eraseTicket. The the
terminal sends a command to the cardlet containing the card instruction CMD eraseTicket
and a digital signature of the ticket number combined with the challenge generated by the
card. On receiving this command the cardlet tests if the expected card instruction is sent. If
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this is the case, the signature is verified. If the signature is correct the ticket in question is
deleted and nxt cmd is set to none.
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Figure 4.9: Give Back Ticket-protocol Part I
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Figure 4.10: Give Back Ticket-protocol Part II
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Figure 4.11: Give Back Ticket-protocol Part III
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4.11 Load Ticket
4.11.1 Purpose
This protocol is used to load a new ticket on a card.
4.11.2 Preconditions
Before this protocol can be executed the terminal must have acquired and verified the public
key of the card. This is done using the Get Card Key-protocol (Section 4.9). It must be
possible to load another ticket on the card, i. e. the number of tickets on the card must be
less than max tickets. There mustn’t be any other protocol running on the card, i. e. the
nxt cmd-field of the cardlet must be any.
4.11.3 The protocol
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Figure 4.12: Load Ticket-protocol Part I42
Figure 4.13: Load Ticket-protocol Part II43
Figure 4.14: Load Ticket-protocol Part III44
Figure 4.15: Load Ticket-protocol Part IV45
4.12 Number Of Tickets
4.12.1 Purpose
This protocol is used by the terminals to determine the number of tickets currently stored on
a card.
4.12.2 Preconditions
The conductor or the user must have been authenticated using the Authenticate Conductor -
protocol (Section 4.4) or the Authenticate User -protocol (Section 4.5) respectively. There
mustn’t be any other protocol running on the card, i. e. the nxt cmd-field of the cardlet must
be any.
4.12.3 The protocol
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Figure 4.16: Number Of Tickets-protocol
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4.13 Recover Load
4.13.1 Purpose
This protocol is user to finalize a load operation that wasn’t complete properly. Incomplete
loads can happen for instance due to communication problems with the server of the ticket
issuer.
4.13.2 Preconditions
There must be a ticket on the card whose load wasn’t completed properly. There mustn’t be
any other protocol running on the card, i. e. the nxt cmd-field of the cardlet must be any.
4.13.3 The protocol
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Figure 4.17: Recover Load -protocol Part I
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Figure 4.18: Recover Load -protocol Part II
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Figure 4.19: Recover Load -protocol Part III
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Figure 4.20: Recover Load -protocol Part IV
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Figure 4.21: Recover Load -protocol Part V
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4.14 Recover Transfer
4.14.1 Purpose
While a ticket is transferred the ticket in question is marked accordingly. Tickets that are
marked as in transfer are unusable. If the ticket transfer is interrupted the ticket remains
unusable until this protocol is run and the source card and the destination card are restored
to consistent internal states.
4.14.2 Preconditions
Both cards, the source and the destination card, must have been authenticated properly using
Authenticate Cardlet-protocol (Section 4.3). On both cards the nxt cmd-attribute must be
any. The two cards must be the source and the destination cards that were actually used
in the erroneous transfer. The source card must be placed in the source card terminal, the
destination card in the destination card terminal.
4.14.3 The protocol
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Figure 4.22: Recover Transfer -protocol Part I
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Figure 4.23: Recover Transfer -protocol Part II
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Figure 4.24: Recover Transfer -protocol Part III
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Figure 4.25: Recover Transfer -protocol Part IV
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Figure 4.26: Recover Transfer -protocol Part V
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Figure 4.27: Recover Transfer -protocol Part VI
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Figure 4.28: Recover Transfer -protocol Part VII
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Figure 4.29: Recover Transfer -protocol Part VIII
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Figure 4.30: Recover Transfer -protocol Part IX
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Figure 4.31: Recover Transfer -protocol Part X
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Figure 4.32: Recover Transfer -protocol Part XI
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Figure 4.33: Recover Transfer -protocol Part XII
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Figure 4.34: Recover Transfer -protocol Part XIII
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Figure 4.35: Recover Transfer -protocol Part XIV
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Figure 4.36: Recover Transfer -protocol Part XV
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Figure 4.37: Recover Transfer -protocol Part XVI
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Figure 4.38: Recover Transfer -protocol Part XVII
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Figure 4.39: Recover Transfer -protocol Part XVIII
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Figure 4.40: Recover Transfer -protocol Part XIX
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Figure 4.41: Recover Transfer -protocol Part XX
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4.15 Select
4.15.1 Purpose
This protocol describes the actions performed by the select-method. The select-method
of a cardlet is called by the card runtime environment when the card receives an APDU
containing a select command for the corresponding cardlet.
4.15.2 Preconditions
None.
4.15.3 The protocol
The select-method resets protocol-specific attributes of the cardlet and tries to resume an
incomplete ticket transfer if necessary.
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Figure 4.42: Select-protocol
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4.16 Set User PIN
4.16.1 Purpose
This function is used by the card owner to set a new PIN. After a successful authentication
of the card holder the card accepts a new user PIN and stores it.
4.16.2 Preconditions
The owner of the card must have been successfully authenticated using the Authenticate User -
protocol (Section 4.5). There mustn’t be any other protocol running on the card, i. e. the
nxt cmd-field of the cardlet must be any.
4.16.3 The protocol
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Figure 4.43: Set User PIN -protocol
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4.17 Transfer Ticket
4.17.1 Purpose
This tickets is used to transfer a ticket form one card to another. This is useful for example
if a group of people travels together and one person buys the tickets for all participants and
hands them one later.
4.17.2 Preconditions
Before this protocol can be executed the terminal must have acquired the public key and the
public key signature of the destination card and the source card. This is done using the Get
Card Key-protocol (Section 4.9). The keys must be stored in the attributes dest card key
and source card key respectively. The signatures must be stored in dest card key sig and
source card key sig. It must be possible to load another ticket on the destination card, i.
e. the number of tickets on the destination card must be less than max tickets. On both
cards the nxt cmd-field of the cardlet must be any, i. e. none of the cards should currently
run another protocol. Both cards mustn’t be in an incomplete transfer, i. e. a transfer must
be completed before a new one can be started. The ticket number which is transferred to
the card must be a correct ticket number, i. e. the transmitted number must be less or equal
to the number of tickets currently stored on the card. The ticket that is to be transferred
mustn’t be obliterated. The owner of the source card must be authenticated.
4.17.3 Additional information
If this protocol is performed on a computer with only one card reader, it is necessary to switch
between destination and source card. After removing and subsequently reinserting a card the
protocol cannot be continued at once, due to the resetting of the nxt cmd-field. To restore
the proper value of nxt cmd the Continue Transfer -protocol must be applied.
4.17.4 The protocol
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Figure 4.44: Transfer Ticket-protocol Part I
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Figure 4.45: Transfer Ticket-protocol Part II
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Figure 4.46: Transfer Ticket-protocol Part III
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Figure 4.47: Transfer Ticket-protocol Part IV
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Figure 4.48: Transfer Ticket-protocol Part V
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Figure 4.49: Transfer Ticket-protocol Part VI
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Figure 4.50: Transfer Ticket-protocol Part VII
86
Figure 4.51: Transfer Ticket-protocol Part VIII
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Figure 4.52: Transfer Ticket-protocol Part IX
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Figure 4.53: Transfer Ticket-protocol Part X
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Figure 4.54: Transfer Ticket-protocol Part XI
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Figure 4.55: Transfer Ticket-protocol Part XII
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Figure 4.56: Transfer Ticket-protocol Part XIII
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Figure 4.57: Transfer Ticket-protocol Part XIV
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Figure 4.58: Transfer Ticket-protocol Part XV
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4.18 View Checks
4.18.1 Purpose
This protocol is used by the terminals to get the checks of a ticket that is stored on the card.
4.18.2 Preconditions
The conductor or the user must have been authenticated using the Authenticate Conductor -
protocol (Section 4.4) or the Authenticate User -protocol (Section 4.5) respectively. The ticket
number which is transferred to the card must be a correct ticket number, i. e. the transmitted
number must be less or equal to the number of tickets currently stored on the card. If the
user isn’t authenticated the cardlet will only reveal the checks of tickets that aren’t locked.
If the checks of a locked ticket are requested and the user isn’t authenticated, the card will
answer with SW DATA INVALID. There mustn’t be any other protocol running on the card, i.
e. the nxt cmd-field of the cardlet must be any.
4.18.3 The protocol
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Figure 4.59: View Checks-protocol
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4.19 View Ticket
4.19.1 Purpose
This protocol is used by the terminals to get the data and the status of a ticket that is stored
on the card.
4.19.2 Preconditions
The conductor or the user must have been authenticated using the Authenticate Conductor -
protocol (Section 4.4) or the Authenticate User -protocol (Section 4.5) respectively. The ticket
number which is transferred to the card must be a correct ticket number, i. e. the transmitted
number must be less or equal to the number of tickets currently stored on the card. If the user
isn’t authenticated the cardlet will only reveal tickets that aren’t locked. If a locked ticket
is requested and the user isn’t authenticated, the card will answer with SW DATA INVALID.
There mustn’t be any other protocol running on the card, i. e. the nxt cmd-field of the cardlet
must be any.
4.19.3 The protocol
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Figure 4.60: View Ticket-protocol
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